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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS-
PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF JUVENILES' NAMES DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Respondents, the Charleston Daily Mail, and the Charleston Daily
Gazette, dispatched reporters to the scene of a shooting at a local
junior high school.1 The reporters obtained from eye-witnesses the
name of the alleged assailant, a fourteen-year-old juvenile, and
both newspapers prepared articles for publication. 2 The Daily
Mail's first publication did not include the name of the juvenile
involved because a West Virginia statute prohibited such
publication. 3 The Daily Gazette, however, published the .juvenile's
name and his picture. 4 Because the juvenile's name was also
broadcast by at least three radio stations, the Daily Mail felt the
name was within the public knowledge, so the name was published
in a subsequent publication. 5 The respondents were indicted for
knowingly publishing the name of a youth appearing before the
juvenile court, in violation of a West Virginia statute prohibiting
1. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., U.S.. ... 99 S. Ct. 2667, 2669 (1979).
2. Id.
3 Id. The statute prohibiting the newspaper publication of the names of juveniles provides as
follows:
Any evidence given in any cause or proceeding under this chapter, or any order,
.Judgment or finding therein, or any adjudication upon the status of juvenile
delinquent herctolbre made or rendered, shall not in any civil, criminal or other cause
or proceeding whatever in any court, be lawful or proper evidence against such child
Ibr any purpose whatsoever except in subsequent cases under this chapter involving
the same child: nor shall the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this
chapter, be published in any newspaper without written order of the court; nor shall any such
aljudication upon the status of any child by a .juvenile court operate to impose any of
the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a
criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a
(onviction, nor shall any such adjudication operate to disqualify a child in any future
civil service examination, appointment, or application.
W. VA. ConF § 49-7-3 (1976) (emphasis added).
4. -. U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 2669.
5. Id.
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such publication. 6  Respondents filed an original jurisdiction
petition with the West Virginia Supreme Court for a writ of
prohibition.7 This court held that the West Virginia statute was a
prior restraint and allowed the writ.8 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that the interest of the state in protecting
juveniles was not an interest of the highest order and therefore
could not justify a criminal sanction for the publication of the
names of juveniles appearing before the West Virginia Juvenile
Court. 9 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., __ U.S. __ , 99 S. Ct.
2667 (1979).
The first amendment provides that "[c]ongress shall make no
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 10 The
first amendment has been applied to prohibit direct or indirect
restrictions upon the freedoms of speech and press. Such things as
taxes," judicial injunctions 12 and any other actions by government
which might hinder the exercise of the first amendment freedoms
before an adequate determination that such exercise is unprotected
by the first amendment, 13 have been declared unconstitutional.
Typically a restriction upon the first amendment rights will take the
form of either a prior restraint 14 or a subsequent punishment, '5
Prior restraints act to prohibit speech before the speech takes
place. 16 The effect of a prior restraint is to freeze speech.' 7 Because
6. Id. The penalty for \ iolating \Vest Virginia Code section 49-7-3 is codified at section 49-7-20
and pi' 'ides as fIllows:
A person who violates an order, rule, or regulation made under the authority of this
chapter, or who violates a provision of this chapter for which punishment has not heen
specifically provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, or confined in jail not less
than five days nor more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment.
W. VA. COOF § 49-7 -20(1976).
7. _ US. at__, 99 S. Ct. at 2669.
8. State ex rel. Daily Mail PublishingCo. v. Smith, -_W. Va. -, 248 S.E.2d 269 (1978).
9. - U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
10. U.S. CONST. tllCnd. I.
II. Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). In Grosfean the Court struck down a
ax of two percnt of the gross reccipts of' companis involved in publishing materials with I
circ'ulation of greater than 20.000 copies per week. The Court declared thfte tax unconsti it tional
btecause it was a restraint upon the press and ths abridged the first aitendment rights, Id. it 250.
12. Near s. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near the Court struck down a statute under
which an il *jui lion was procured. The injunction prohibited ;t newspaper from publishing arties
which accused oflicials oftailure to perform their duties p roperly, Id. at 722-23.
13. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). In Pittsburg/h Press the
Court field that a law prohibiting newspapers from classifying their want ads according to sex for
non-exempt job opportunities did not violate first amendment rights. Id. at 391.
14. Id. at 390. A prior restraint is one which suppresses a publication before it is determined that
the speer Ii is unprotected by the first amendment Id. For a more extensive discussion of prior
restraints. see Litwack. The Doctrine ofPrior Restraints. 12 HARv. C.R. - C.L.L. RFv,. 519 (1977).
wherte prior restraints are defined as "formal prohibition[si oti speech. imposed in advance of
ittriantict oi piblication." Id. at 520.
15. Landmark Com., Inc. v. Virginia. 435 U.S. 829. 841 (1978).
16. Se supra note 14 for a definitin of prior restraint.
17. Nefiraska Press Assoe. v. Stuart. 427 U.S. 539. 559I 976).
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of this freezing effect, the United States Supreme Court has
declared all prior restraints to be presumptively invalid."8 The
presumed invalidity of a prior restraint does not make the first
amendment absolute. Instead the government's asserted interest is
subjected to a balancing test whereby the first amendment right
being infringed is balanced against the asserted governmental
interest.' 9 The Court has determined that the only interest
sufficient to pass this balancing test is a compelling state interest.
20
If the government can demonstrate that the prior restraint is
protecting a compelling state interest, that prior restraint will be
upheld.
2 1
Unlike the effect of a prior restraint, the effect of a subsequent
punishment is not to "freeze" speech, but to "chill" 1t.22 A
subsequent punishment restricts speech by imposing a penalty after
the speech has taken place. 23 The subsequent punishment does not
require the speaker to remain silent by immediately imposing itself
upon the speaker, but the subsequent punishment is imposed only
after a judicial determination and a conviction for violation of some
governmental regulation. Further, that conviction is subject to all
of the procedures and protections granted persons in the court
system before a penalty may be imposed.2 4 Because a conviction
offers a number of opportunities for acquittal and release before the
punishment is final, the effect of a subsequent punishment is only
to "chill" speech. 25 Therefore, unlike a prior restraint which
"freezes" speech2 6 and is thus presumed to be invalid, there is no
such presumption when the restriction upon first amendment rights
is a subsequent punishment. It follows from this that the test to
uphold a subsequent punishment should be different from the test
to uphold a prior restraint.
The Court will uphold a subsequent punishment if the
government asserts an interest sufficent to justify the chilling effect
of the subsequent punishment on the freedoms of the first
amendment. 27 Furthermore, the government requires that the
18. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70(1963).
19. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U S. 36, 4t9-51 (1961).
20. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1944). In Thomas, a union repr's'ntativ was
found guilty of contempt of court for refusing to oby an injunction which prihibicd him trom
speaking at a union recruiting function. The Supreme Court foiund that controlling and regulating
labor unions was not a compelling state interest. 1d.
21. New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713. 714(1971).





27. Iandmark (im., lot. I . Virginia. 435 U.S. 829. 831 (10711).
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subsequent punishment be necessary to further the asserted state
interest, and, in fact, it must do So.28 Subsequent punishments and
prior restraints will be upheld if the facts of the case show that they
meet these tests. Generally subsequent punishments and prior
restraints are upheld in areas such as obscenity, 29 threats to the
national welfare, 30 and cases of defamation 31 because the Court has
declared these forms of speech to be unprotected by the first
amendment.
32
In addition to the speech which has been declared
unprotected, the Court has also allowed other methods of
incidentally burdening the press. 33 This "burdening" can take the
form of denying the press access to certain areas.
34
The Court stated in Pell v. Procunier,35 that the press has no
constitutional right of access to places where members of the public
are not generally allowed, 36 and the government has no affirmative
duty to make those areas available to the press. 37 Thus, if the area is
closed to the general public it may be closed to the press, 38 and
information which can be had only through direct access to those
areas becomes unavailable to the press, except by other, less direct
means. 39 For example, the press has been allowed to obtain
supposedly unobtainable information received from their
"sources" and publish it, as it did in New York Times Co. v. United
States. 40
Besides being able to publish information which the press
obtains from its "sources," the press may choose to wait until the
information enters an area to which the general public has access
28. Id. at 841.
29. 283 U.S. at 716; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. 36-37 (1973): ef Bantam Books. Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
30. 283 U.S. at 716: Schenck v. United States, 294 U.S. 47. 52 (1919): cf Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg the Court stated that mere advocacy of an overthrow is
not enough to sustain a restraint on first amendment rights. The advocacy must be likely to incite or
produce imminent lawless action. Id. at 447.
31. 283 U.S. at 715.
32. 413 U.S. at 23 (obscenity is unprotected by the first amendment); 283 U.S. at 715 (libel).
249 U.S. at 52 (speech which constitutes a threat to the national defense).
33. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
34. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (reporters denied access to prisons to interview).
35. 417 U.S. at 817.
36. Id. at 834.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg the Court held that a newsman
could be required to testify about his news sources before a grand jury. The Court reasoned that a
newspaper's sources were not likely to dry up as a result of this ruling because many of the
informants depended upon exposure by the press to get their ideas across. From the discussion it is
apparent that the Court feels that the press can find ways to obtain information which is generally
unobtainable by the public. Id. at 695.
40. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In New York Times the Court vacated an injunction which enjoined the
New York Times from publishing the "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam
Policy," (Pentagon Papers), which were classified overnment documents. Id.
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and then obtain the information. 41 Once the information is
obtained its publication can be restrained only if it falls under one
of the categories of speech which have been declared unprotected
by the first amendment.
42
The press has generally been afforded access to the court
system, because of the important role the press has in subjecting the
court officers, police, and the judicial process itself, to "extensive
public scrutiny and criticism. ,,43 It is believed that this scrutiny and
criticism will protect against a possible miscarriage of justice. 44 For
this reason the United States Supreme Court is reluctant to deny
the press access to the court system.4 5 However, although the press
is generally granted access to the courts, the press may be
prohibited from publishing information Which may adversely affect
the functioning of the court system or the procurement ofjustice for
the defendant. 46 Thus, the courts may close their doors and deny
the press access in certain situations.
4 7
One such situation in which the press has traditionally been
excluded is the juvenile court system. 48 This system was first
adopted in Illinois in 1899, and has spread throughout the United
States.49 It was established because reformers felt the harsh
treatment given children prior to the adoption of the present
juvenile court system did not meet the needs of either the child or
society, thus a new system specifically designed for juveniles was
required. 50 Under this new system the court would not determine
guilt or innocence, but would look at the child from the viewpoint
of what was best for him. 51 The juvenile court was to act in loco
parentis52 or under the parens patriae doctrine. 53 Originally, the
system was for treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile
41. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). A statute prohibited the publication
of the names of rape victims. The press obtained the name of such a victim from a public record and
)roceede(l to publish the name of the victim. The Court held that because the information was on the
public record, the publication could not be punished. Id. at 495.
42. Se rsupra note 32 for the categories of speech declared unprotected by the first amendment.
43. Sheppard v. Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333,350 (1966).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. In Sheppard the Court held that the defendant was denied a fair trial because the trial
court did not impose enough restrictions upon the press. Id.
47. Id, Se also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, - U.S. __, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
In Gannett the Court stated that the public did not have a constitutional right to attend a pre-trial
proceeding where closure is necessary to protect the rights of the defendants to a fair trial. Id. at
__. 99 S. Ct. at 2913.
48. __ U.S. at __, 99S. Ct. at 2672.
49. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1. 14(1967).
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id.
52. Id. Howard v. United States. 2 F.2d 170 (E.D. Ky. 1942). stated that "a person acting in
loco parentis is one 'assuming the parental character or discharging parental duties.' " Id. at 174.
53. 387 U.S. at 16. The doctrine of parens patriae grants the legislature power to provide
proteclion for persons and their property. McIntosh s. Dill, 86 Okla. I. 205 P.917 (1922).
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offender, 54 thus, the system used a civil system approach 55 for
which it was inappropriate to apply the criminal procedures of the
adult court.
5 6
Today, although the juvenile court system still maintains a
civil system approach, and still applies the parens patriae rationale,
juveniles are entitled to some of the constitutional rights afforded to
adults accused of crimes, such as notice of the charges, 57 the right to
an attorney,58 the right to avoid self-incrimination59 and the right to
cross-examine witnesses.
6 0
Although not a constitutional right, juveniles have been
afforded anonymity when brought before the courts. 61 It is believed
that this anonymity facilitates the rehabilitation of the juvenile
because the public does not label him as a delinquent, and the usual
stigma which attaches when a person is labeled a delinquent is
avoided. 6s The states have an interest in seeing that the juvenile is
not labeled and remains anonyrious, because the purpose of the
juvenile court system is to rehabilitatc juveniles," : and that
rehabilitation is more likely to occur if the juvenile remains
anonymous. 64
In Davis" v. Alaska65 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the state's interest in maintaining
the jul\enile's anonymity outweighed the right of an accused to
confront and cross-examine the witness against him. 66 The Court
determined that it did not. In reaching its determination the Court
balanced the state's interest in preserving the juvenile's anonymity
against the defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine the
witness and determined that the state's interest in juvenile
anonymity could not require a vital constitutional right to yield. 67
The Smith case also involves a constitutional right and the
54. 387 U.S. a, 15.
55. Id. ai 17.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 33.
58. Id. at 36.
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id. at 57.
61. - U.S. at - , 99 S. Cr. at 2672.
62. 387 U.S. at 24. In re Gault stated that "[tihe Juvenile offender is now classed as a
'delinquent'. . . . It is disconcerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less
stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to adults." Id. at 23-24. For other suggestions for dealing
with the problem of juvenile anonymity, see Geis, Publication of the Names of J'uveniles. .23 MONT. L.
REV. 141 (1962); Note, The Press andJuvenile Delinquency Hearings: A Contextual A nalysis of the Unrefined
FirstAnendmentRightofAccess, 39U. PITT. L. REV. 121 (1977).
63. 387 U.S. at 16 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
64. Seesupra note 62 for discussion of the juvenile anonymity rationalt'.
65. 415 U.S. 308.




asserted state interest of maintaining a juvenile's anonymity .68 In
Smith the state of West Virginia asserted that its criminal stitute
69
was justified by the state's interest in preserving the juvenile's
anonymity.70 The Court concluded that it was not.7" In reaching its
decision the Court first stated that both a prior restraint and a
subsequent punishment required the highest state interest to
sustain their validity.7 2 The Court added that it did not have to
address the issue of whether the West Virginia statute acted as a
prior restraint,7 3 because the statute did not satisfy the lesser
constitutional standards set forth in Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 71 for subsequent punishments.1
5
To determine that the state's interest in preserving juvenile
anonymity was not an interest sufficient to justify a subsequent
punishment, the Court applied the rationale and balancing test of
Davis.7 6 The Court concluded that the first amendment right of
freedom of the press was as important as the sixth amendment right
to cross-examine witnesses, therefore the first amendment rights,
like the sixth amendment rights in Davis, would prevail over the
state's interest in protecting juveniles.77
The Court also determined that the state interest asserted in
Smith was not furthered by the application of a punishment because
the restriction applied to newspapers only. Under the statute,
television and radio stations could broadcast the name of the
juvenile and not be subject to any punishment. In the Smith case
three radio stations had broadcast the name of the juvenile, and
none of those stations were indicted. Thus the Court determined
that the statute did not serve its intended purpose.78
Finally, the Court stated that there was no evidence that it was
necessary to impose a criminal penalty to protect the juvenile.7 9
The Court based this on the fact that only a few states find it
necessary to provide a criminal punishment to protect the juvenile's
anonymity. 80
Smith extends the rationale that once the information has
68.- U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
69. See supra not 3 for the text of this statute.
70. - U.S. at__ , 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
71. Id. at__ 99 S. Ct. at 2672.
72. Id. at + 99 S. Ct. at 2670.
73. Id.
74. 435 U.S. at 843.
75. __ U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 2670. See supra note 27 and text for the Landmark test.
76. Id. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. al__, 99 S. Ct. at 2672.
80. Id.
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escaped the protection of the government and moved into the
public domain its publication may not be restrained unless there is
a need to further an interest of the highest order, 81 or the
publication involves material which the United States Supreme
Court has determined to be unprotected speech.8 2 The Court
clearly holds that the state interest asserted in Smith, juvenile
anonymity, does not meet the requirements set for even a
subsequent punishment.83 If the Court applies its previous holdings
in Landmark8 4 and Cox85 it will not uphold a prior restraint or a
subsequent punishment for the publication of a juvenile's name if
that information is obtained from a third party or when it is
obtained in an area where the public is generally allowed. Because
the Court has determined that juvenile anonymity is not a sufficient
interest to support a criminal penalty, a concurring opinion feels
that the states are left with no effective method of protecting their
asserted interest in juvenile anonymity. 6 As the Court points out,
however, the majority of the states do not enforce their juvenile
anonymity interests with criminal punishment. 87 The pertinent
sections of the United States Code8 8 and the North Dakota Century
Code8 9 both fall within this category.
The federal code expressly prohibits publication of ajuvenile's
name 90 but it does not provide a criminal penalty in the event the
name is published, as did the West Virginia statute. 91 The federal
code does provide a contempt of court section. 92 Under a strict
construction of the Smith holding that a criminal sanction can not be
imposed for the publication of a juvenile's name, 9 an application
of this contempt provision 94 as a civil contempt95 would probably be
upheld. Thus, the federal code is enforceable without a criminal
sanction.
The North Dakota statute, unlike the federal and West
Virginia statutes, does not expressly prohibit publication of any
81. Id. at__. 99S. Ct. at 2671.
82. Srsupra note 32 for the categories of speech declared unprotected by the first amendment.
83.__ U.S. at-. 99S. Ct. at 2671.
84. 435 U.S. 829.
85. 420 U.S. 469.
86. - U. S. at_ . 99S. Ct. at 2673.
87. Id. at . 99 S. Ct. at 2672.
88.18 U.S.C, § 5038(d)(2)(1979).
89. N.D. C IT. CoiEw 27-20-51 (Supp. 1979) & 27-20-52 (1974).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(d)(2)(1979).
91 . - U.S. at . 99 S. Ct. at 2668-69. Seesupra note 3 forthe text of the statute.
92. 18 U.S.C. §401 (1979).
9:3. - U.S. at_ . 99S. Ct. at 2672.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1979).
95. McCrone v. United States. 307 U.S. 61 (1939). Civil contempt arises when the punishment
is remedial. when it only serves the purpose of the complaint, and when it is intended to act as a
deterrent to offenses against individuals and not the public. Id. at 64.
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kind. 96 It instead provides protection for the juvenile by prohibiting
access to the juvenile's files. 97 The North Dakota statutes lso
provide contempt of court proceedings for anyone who interferes
with the juvenile court's function. 98 This statute could be
interpreted to require a compliance by the news media with the
state's interest in preserving a juvenile's anonymity and thus
publication of identifying information by the news media could be
civilly restrained. Also the contempt of court section allows the
juvenile court to punish those persons who abuse their right of
access to juvenile records. Following the rationale of Smith, which
prohibits only criminal sanctions for publicat i(n,. Ihe N,rlth
Dakota statutes would probably be upheld.
ROSEILLEN M. SAND
96. N.I). CET. Coi- § § 27-20-51 (,Supp. 1979) & 27-21-52 (19)74).
97. Id.
98. N.I). (EN . (;o - 27-2)-55 (1974).
99. __ U.S. at ,99 S. Ct. at 2672.

